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Abstract  I consider two semantic issues concerning will-sentences: Stalnaker’s 
Asymmetry and modal subordination in Karttunen-type discourses. The former prima 
facie points to drawing a distinction between will and modal verbs, as it seems to show 
that will does not license non-specific indefinites. The latter points in the opposite 
direction, suggesting that will-sentences involve some kind of modality. To account for 
the data, I make a twofold proposal: will is semantically a tense, hence it doesn’t 
contribute a quantifier over modal alternatives; a modal feature, however, is introduced in 
the interpretation of a will-sentence through a supervaluational strategy universally 
quantifying over possible futures. That the universal quantification is not part of will’s 
lexical semantics is shown to have consequences that ultimately contribute to explain 
Stalnaker’s Asymmetry. Furthermore, that a modal quantification is present anyway in 
the interpretation of a will-sentence is shown to imply the availability of modal 
subordination in Karttunen-type discourses. Since the modal feature is not due to will’s 
semantics but to a presumably universal property of the underlying temporal model, the 
observed modal behaviour is not viewed as a contingent property of will, and modal 
interpretations of future tense markers are expected to be available cross-linguistically. 
 
Keywords Future – Modality – Tense – Non-specific indefinites – Modal subordination – 
Supervaluations – Branching Time 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper I reconsider the thorny issue of whether the future auxiliary will should be 
regarded as a tense or as a modal, by focusing on the interpretation of indefinite noun 
phrases in will-sentences. A distinction that will play a key role is the one between 
specific and non-specific (interpretations of) indefinites, illustrated in (1a-c): 
(1) a. Mary is trying to find a book on modality. 
 b. ∃x [book-on-modality(x) ∧ try(Mary, ^find(Mary, x)]  
  (‘There is a particular book on modality that Mary is trying to find.’) 
 c. try(Mary, ^∃x [book-on-modality(x) ∧ find(Mary, x)] 
  (‘Mary is trying to find some book on modality or other.’) 
The indefinite is specific in (1b), the characteristic feature of this interpretation being that 
a certain book corresponds to the NP. By contrast, it is non-specific in (1c), as there is no 
particular book semantically related to the NP on this interpretation.1 
 The main question that I will address is the following: 
(Q)  Can the indefinite object of an extensional verb be non-specific in a will-
sentence?2 
The idea behind the argument is simple: if will is a modal (hence an intensional) operator, 
it should be able to give rise to non-specific indefinites in object position, as the 
intensional predicate is trying to does in (1a). We will see that will does give rise to non-
specific indefinites, although to ones that, at the surface, seem to differ from non-specific 
indefinites of the more familiar sort, for which wide scope existential quantification of 
the indefinite’s variable (for short, WSE) blatantly fails. To detect this sort of non-
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specific indefinites, other tests are needed, and I’ll discuss some relevant linguistic data 
in the following sections. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In sect. 2 I introduce Stalnaker’s 
Asymmetry, the prima facie observation that the inferences in (2) and (3) differ in logical 
status: the former is valid only under a reading of its premise in which the president’s 
obligation is in relation to a certain woman – WSE fails as a general inference rule in this 
case; the validity of the latter, however, does not seem to depend on a particular 
interpretation of the premise in a similar way – WSE seems to be validly applicable as a 
general inference rule there.3 
(2)  a. President Carter has to appoint a woman to the Supreme Court. 
 b. Therefore, there is a particular woman that the president has to appoint. 
(3)  a. President Carter will appoint a woman to the Supreme Court. 
 b. Therefore, there is a particular woman that the president will appoint. 
From Stalnaker’s Asymmetry, I provisionally conclude that (Q) has a negative answer. In 
sect. 3 some data are presented which question this conclusion. At first, I consider the 
interpretation of discourses like (4): 
(4) Mary wants to marry a rich man. He must be a banker. [Karttunen 1976] 
As Karttunen (1976) remarks, (4) is ambiguous between two readings: the specific 
interpretation of a rich man correlates with the epistemic interpretation of must, while the 
non-specific interpretation of the indefinite is associated with a deontic-like interpretation 
of the modal, described later on as teleological.4 I observe that the variant of (4) with will 
in the place of want doesn’t seem to allow for a reading in which a rich man is non-
specific and must teleological: 
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(5)   Mary will marry a rich man. He must be a banker. 
While this conforms with the provisional conclusion from sect. 2, I then show that we do 
find Karttunen-type discourses with will followed by must, in which must is teleological; 
furthermore, as we switch from must to should, it becomes easier to observe a parallel 
between want and will, as in discourses (6) and (7), both displaying the teleological 
interpretation of should: 
(6) Mary wants to marry a rich man. He should be a banker. 
(7) Mary will marry a rich man. He should be a banker. 
In sect. 4 I examine the possibility that the teleological interpretation of the modal would 
not require non-specificity of the indefinite in the will-sentence but a weaker condition of 
ignorance of the actual referent’s identity. Here I argue that there is genuine non-
specificity and make a preliminary informal suggestion to explain away the prima facie 
contrast between non-specificity of the indefinite object and some critical data at the 
basis of Stalnaker’s Asymmetry. In sect. 5 a formal analysis of will is proposed on which 
its basic semantic contribution is that of a tense, as conceived in 
referential/presuppositional analyses (e.g. Heim 1994): a temporal variable whose value 
is presupposed to be a situation in the future of the utterance situation. A central 
assumption is that speakers represent the future state of the world as open to themselves, 
in terms of a plurality of possible futures branching off from the present situation; this is 
reflected in the interpretation model, a variant of classical Branching Time (Thomason 
1984, Belnap et al. 2001). All these possible futures are assumed to be equally eligible 
candidates for the truth-conditional evaluation of a will-statement. I further assume that, 
on top of will’s basic semantics, a default universal quantification over the domain of 
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possible futures comes into play as a supervaluational strategy to overcome their 
plurality. This quantification introduces a modal feature in the interpretation of will, 
which accounts for the relation of modal dependence between will and a subsequent 
teleological modal should / must. Furthermore, from the assumption that this 
quantification is due to a supervaluational strategy, it follows that it invariantly takes 
maximum scope. The lack of scope interactions between the quantifier over futures and 
the existential quantifier of the indefinite provides the key to explain why Stalnaker’s 
Asymmetry arises. In sect. 6 I address the issue of the theoretical status of the 
supervaluational strategy, and discuss some general consequences of the proposed 
analysis with regard to the interaction between semantics and pragmatics. Sect. 7 
concludes. 
2.  Stalnaker’s Asymmetry 
Against an intensional analysis of will as a modal of necessity, one could argue that the 
answer to our initial question (Can the indefinite object of an extensional verb be non-
specific in a will-sentence?) is negative, based on the contrast between the dialogues (8) 
and (9):5  
(8) X: President Carter has to appoint a woman to the Supreme Court. 
 Y: Who do you think he has to appoint? 
 X: He doesn’t have to appoint any particular woman; he just has to appoint some 
woman or other. 
(9) X: President Carter will appoint a woman to the Supreme Court. 
 Y: Who do you think he will appoint? 
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 X: He won’t appoint any particular woman; he just will appoint some woman or 
other. 
In dialogue (8), “Y gives the quantified expression a woman wide scope in interpreting 
X’s statement. X, in his response to Y, shows that he meant the quantifier to have narrow 
scope”.6 The acceptability of X’s answer shows that the indefinite can indeed be 
interpreted in the semantic scope of the necessity modal in this case, hence non-
specifically. X’s response in dialogue (9), on the other hand, “is obviously non-sense. 
There must be a particular person that [the president] will appoint, although the speaker 
need not know who it is”.7 
Following Stalnaker’s line of reasoning, we can submit that there is a contrast in 
logical status between the inference in (10) and the one in (11): 
(10)  a. The president will appoint a woman. 
 b. Therefore, there is a particular woman that he will appoint. 
(11)  a. The president has to appoint a woman. 
 b. Therefore, there is a particular woman that he has to appoint. 
On the one hand, for (10a) to be true there should be a particular woman of whom it is 
true that the president will appoint her at some point. We may not know who that 
particular woman is, the president himself may not know her identity; in principle, the 
woman may even not have been born yet. Still, the truth of (10a) appears to require that 
there is (in a temporally unrestricted sense) a particular woman that the president will 
appoint. On the other hand, for (11a) to be true there need not be a particular woman of 
whom it is true that the president has to appoint her. Accordingly, if we take the 
quantificational idiom there is in (10b) and (11b) to express temporally unrestricted 
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quantification (over a domain which includes future individuals, as well as present ones), 
we regard the inference in (10) as unconditionally valid, whereas the validity of the 
inference in (11) is seen as contingent upon a construal of the premise in which the 
indefinite a woman is interpreted specifically – indeed, only on the specific interpretation 
is there a particular individual semantically related to the indefinite. Crucially, the 
premise (11a) has an alternative reading, one in which the president’s obligations could 
be fulfilled by his appointing anyone of different women. On the latter interpretation, 
there is no particular individual corresponding to the indefinite, and the inference in (11) 
does not go through. I will refer to the prima facie contrast between the unconditional 
validity of (10) and the conditional validity of (11) as Stalnaker’s Asymmetry.  
 As suggested by Stalnaker’s description of dialogue (8) quoted above, the 
envisaged ambiguity of (11a) could be explained by assuming a standard, Hintikka 
(1962)-style account of have to as a universal quantifier over possible worlds: the 
possible worlds in which all the obligations that the president has in the actual world are 
fulfilled – the president’s deontic alternatives with respect to the actual world w0. If the 
modal have to expresses universal quantification over such deontic alternatives, the 
contrast between the two readings of (11a) can be explained in terms of a scope 
interaction between the universal quantifier corresponding to the modal verb and the 
existential quantifier corresponding to the indefinite. On the specific construal, it is the 
same woman that is picked out across different deontic alternatives, and this is captured 
by the wide scope construal of the indefinite, given in (12a). On the non-specific 
construal, different women can be selected relative to different alternatives, and this is 
captured by the narrow scope construal of the indefinite, given in (12b). 
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(12) a. ∃x [woman(x, w0) ∧ ∀w [Altdeontic(w0, w, Carter) → appoint(Carter, x, w)]] 
 b. ∀w [Altdeontic(w0, w, Carter) → ∃x [woman(x, w) ∧ appoint(Carter, x, w)]]8 
 Now, if will too were to introduce universal quantification over a domain of 
modal alternatives, the same ambiguity should be present in (10a) as has been found in 
(11a), and the validity of the inference in (10) should also be contingent on the specific 
construal of its premise. But (10) appears to be unconditionally valid. The conclusion, by 
modus tollens, is that the auxiliary will, unlike the modal verb have to, does not introduce 
universal quantification over alternatives. 
 The obvious possibility that one could consider at this point is that will should be 
analyzed as an extensional tense operator, on a par with the past tense morphology. The 
semantics of will should thus be thought of in terms of existential quantification over 
times.9 The unconditional validity of (10) would thus be explained as follows: (10a) says 
that there is a time t1 such that t1 follows the time of utterance t0 and the president 
appoints a woman at t1; but from this it follows that there is (in a temporally unrestricted 
sense) a woman x such that there is a time t1 following t0 such that the president appoints 
x at t1, and this is exactly what the conclusion (10b) says. This theory, however, could not 
be the whole story about will. We will see why in the next section. 
3.  Modal subordination in Karttunen-type discourses 
Karttunen (1976) observes a correlation between the specific/non-specific interpretation 
of the indefinite a rich man and the type of interpretation of the modal must in discourses 
like (13) (where we intend that the pronominal subject of the must-sentence is 
anaphorically related to the indefinite a rich man):10 
(13) Mary wants to marry a rich man. He must be a banker. 
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His observation about (13) is two-fold: 
(a) The specific reading of a rich man in the left sentence of the sequence naturally 
correlates with the epistemic reading of must in the right sentence, paraphrasable 
as ‘It is likely that he is a banker’. 
(b) The non-specific reading of the indefinite naturally correlates with a teleological 
reading of the modal, along the lines of the paraphrase ‘It is required that he be a 
banker’.11 
In support of Karttunen’s observation, we can adduce a couple of considerations. 
First, on its specific interpretation, the indefinite a rich man introduces a particular 
discourse referent x which provides a suitable target for the subsequent guess: that very x 
must be a banker; crucially, it would not make sense to make a guess of this form if the 
variable x were not anchored to a particular previously established referent. Second, on 
its non-specific interpretation, the indefinite a rich man can antecede the definite pronoun 
he only if the latter is in the semantic scope of must – indeed, a non-modal continuation 
like She saw him at the opera would not be acceptable, while a one-anaphora would be 
needed in such context, e.g. She saw one at the opera; on this scope construal of the 
continuation, the modal must is naturally understood as elaborating on Mary’s bouletic 
worlds: intuitively, it brings in a further condition that has to be satisfied in each one of 
those worlds. 
A criticism which is worth addressing at this preliminary stage, to pave the way to 
the argument that I will develop later on, is the possibility of contexts in which a rich 
man is specific and must is nevertheless teleological. One such type of context is 
characterized by the fact that the source of the teleological modal base of must is not 
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Mary, that is, it is not Mary who imposes the requirements that a man must meet in order 
to be eligible to become her husband.12 Suppose that you are the teleological source in 
question, and among the requisites that the future husband of Mary has to satisfy, you 
contemplate the property of being a banker. Suppose further that you have overheard that 
there is a certain wealthy fellow whom Mary wants to marry. In this case, you could say 
(14) to me: 
(14) I heard that Mary wants to marry a rich man. You should remind her that he must 
be a banker! 
At least if embedded in a discourse like (14), which favors the dissociation between Mary 
and the modal source, (13) does allow for the combination of a specific interpretation of a 
rich man and a teleological interpretation of must.13 We will thus take the possibility of 
this context into account in restating Karttunen’s observation in the form of a stricter 
generalization, along the following lines: 
(15) Karttunen’s Generalization 
 In a discourse of the form NP wants to V [a N']i. Hei / Shei must be P: 
a. The epistemic interpretation of must requires the specific interpretation of [a N']. 
b. The teleological interpretation of must requires that [a N'] be non-specific
 (provided that the denotation of NP is the relevant teleological source). 
In what follows, I will restrict the interpretation of my target discourses exclusively to 
contexts satisfying the proviso in (15b), and I will disregard contexts such as the one 
backgrounding (14). I will describe the interpretation of a Karttunen-type discourse as (i) 
modally independent, when it is characterized by a specific indefinite followed by an 
epistemic modal, or as (ii) an instance of modal subordination, otherwise. Consider (13), 
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for example: on the one hand, the interpretation paraphrased as ‘Mary wants to marry a 
rich man. As far as I know, he is a banker.’ will be described as modally independent, 
since the modal base of must in this case is anchored to an external source (plausibly, the 
speaker’s information state) and is independent from the bouletic modal base of want; on 
the other hand, the interpretation rendered as ‘Mary wants to marry a rich man. To be 
eligible to become her husband, the man is required by Mary to be a banker.’ will be 
described as an instance of modal subordination, since the modal base of must, 
intuitively, is dependent on the preceding bouletic modal base. 
Let’s now look at how the future will patterns in discourses similar to (13) above. 
First, consider the following minimal variant of (13): 
(16) Mary will marry a rich man. He must be a banker. 
It seems that the only possible reading of (16) is one in which a rich man is specific and 
must is epistemic (e.g. Mary will marry a certain rich man. As far as I know, he is a 
banker.), while a reading in which must is teleological doesn’t seem possible.14 This is as 
we would expect, given the negative conclusion we drew from Stalnaker’s Asymmetry.15  
If in (16) we replace must with will have to, however, something interesting emerges:  
(17) Mary will marry a rich man. He will have to be a banker. 
For the variant (17), we do get the teleological interpretation that the rich man Mary will 
marry, whoever he will be, is required by her to be a banker.16 My intuition about (17) is 
that the teleological modality, as in Karttunen’s original example, is associated with a 
non-specific interpretation of a rich man, and that if we forced specificity of the object 
(e.g. by using a definite NP instead), we would obtain a different interpretation for the 
whole discourse, as illustrated by (18): 
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(18) Mary will marry the rich man over there. He will have to be a banker. 
While this discourse is probably interpretable in some way, whatever is the interpretation 
that we obtain for it, it doesn’t seem to have a reading in common with (17). 
 Before considering further data with different necessity modals, it is worth noting 
that, even though (16) lacks a reading in which must is teleological, we would go too far 
if we claimed that a sequence will + must in a Karttunen-type discourse never displays 
the teleological interpretation of must. Consider the web-based discourses (19a,b) (the 
former is reported with its preceding context): 
(19) a. [I'm looking to bid farewell to my trusty 1997 Audi A4 2.6 Estate which has 
200,000km on the clock. I'm looking for something just as solid and the same 
size but with much better fuel economy.] I will be buying a used car and it must 
be under £6,000. 
 b. When your EP comes out, I will buy a copy. It must be autographed though! 
These examples seem to unambiguously express the teleological reading of must that was 
missing from (16), and, correspondingly, to feature a non-specific interpretation of the 
indefinite object: (19a)’s intuitive meaning is that the speaker plans on buying a used car 
and puts the requirement of costing less than 6,000 pounds on whatever car he will buy; 
in a parallel way, the intuitive meaning of (19b) is that the speaker plans on buying a 
copy of the addressee’s extended-play and puts the requirement of being autographed on 
the copy he will buy, whatever that will be. 
Other data bearing on the possibility of non-specific indefinites in will-sentences 
are Karttunen-type discourses in which the modal should occurs instead of must. 
Consider the following constructed example to begin with:17 
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(20) Mary will marry a rich man. He should be a banker. 
The modal should here is naturally interpreted as introducing a preference of Mary’s on 
the candidates that she would positively consider for marriage, with an associated non-
specific interpretation of the indefinite – whatever rich man she will end up marrying, she 
has a preference for him to be a banker. It thus appears that a continuation with should 
gives rise to the “non-specific indefinite + teleological modal” reading more easily than a 
continuation with must. 
 The fact just noted might well depend on a lexical difference between must and 
should with respect to their ability to undergo modal subordination, and this in turn might 
be related to a lexical difference between the two with respect to their temporal 
properties. Indeed, must seems to be more constrained than should in allowing for 
temporal shifts towards the future with stative complements,18 as shown by the constrast 
between (21a) and (21b): 
(21) a. John will arrive at 3pm. I should be at home then. 
 b. John will arrive at 3pm. I must be at home then. 
Only the former seems to allow for a relation of temporal anaphora between the will-
sentence and the should-sentence. The issue under discussion, however, would require a 
separate empirical investigation to be settled. Such an inquiry would go far beyond the 
scope of this paper, and I will not have anything more to say about this anyway in what 
follows. 
 Some web-based examples of will + should which show the possibility of a “non-
specific indefinite + teleological modal” reading are reported in (22): 
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(22) a. You will probably only buy a safe once in your life. It should therefore be the 
best and most secure available. 
 b. The Director of Policy and Research will hire and supervise a Policy and 
Research Associate. S/he should be comfortable working in a small team 
environment and partnering with staff members with varying experience and 
levels. 
 c. The commanding Officer of Troops will appoint a mess officer for the troops. 
He should report to the Executive Officer of the ship any irregularities which 
may arise. 
In intuitive terms, a common trait of the will-sentences in (22a-c) is that they introduce 
some generic profile through their indefinite objects, which is then constrained by the 
subsequent should-sentence.19 The intuition here is that the indefinite objects in these 
examples are not specific at all – hence, they are non-specific indefinites. 
Let me conclude the present section by summarizing the main outcomes. The 
claim that the indefinite object of an extensional verb in a will-sentence is necessarily 
specific would now appear to be problematic, in view of the crucial examples with must 
and should considered above. Apparently, we can make sense of the idea that will 
licenses non-specific indefinites in certain contexts, and we could be tempted at this point 
to propose a modal analysis of will. The problem with such an analysis is that it would 
still have to explain why Stalnaker’s Asymmetry arises. I’ll return to this dilemma at the 
end of the next section and again in sect. 5, where a formal framework will be proposed 
in which a solution to the problem can be cast. In the next section, I’ll start addressing an 
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objection against the claim that, in Karttunen-type discourses, the teleological 
interpretation of the necessity modal requires the indefinite antecedent to be non-specific. 
4.  Non-specific indefinite or ignorance of the referent’s identity? 
As we saw in the previous section, discourse (20) (‘Mary will marry a rich man. He 
should be a banker.’) has a reading which points to the existence of non-specific 
interpretations of indefinites in will-sentences. I will now consider an argument to the 
effect that the interpretation of a rich man in (20) would only have a superficial 
resemblance to the genuine non-specific interpretation of indefinite objects in the 
complement of want.20 The argument, which ultimately will take us back to Stalnaker’s 
Asymmetry, is as follows. 
 Consider dialogue (23): 
(23) Bill: John will marry an Italian. 
 Jane: Who is she? 
 Bill: ??No one in particular / He doesn’t know yet. She should be from 
Tuscany, though (as he would very much like to go live there). 
Bill’s reply to Jane’s question clearly shows the teleological interpretation of should. 
Importantly, it also shows that the answer No one in particular is unacceptable, while the 
statement of ignorance He doesn’t know yet is good. This is in striking contrast with the 
variant of (23) given in (24), in which want occurs instead of will. Both answers make 
full sense here: 
(24) Bill: John wants to marry an Italian. 
 Jane: Who is she? 
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 Bill: No one in particular / He doesn’t know yet. She should be from Tuscany, 
though (as he would very much like to go live there). 
Taking the unacceptability of No one in particular in (23) at face value, the objection is 
that there would be no genuine non-specific interpretation of the indefinite an Italian in 
this dialogue, but only ignorance on the part of the conversational participants (mainly on 
the part of John) with regard to the identity of the actual referent; relatedly, the 
teleological interpretation of should in (23) would be made possible precisely by the fact 
that the identity of the referent is not known, not by the fact that there is no particular 
woman semantically related to the indefinite (there has to be such particular woman – so 
the argument runs, otherwise we would not understand why the answer No one in 
particular is bad). 
 I would like to suggest that there is more than ignorance of the woman’s identity 
involved in (23). Provided that people normally decide themselves in advance on who 
they are going to marry, the fact that John doesn’t know yet which Italian he will marry 
can be claimed to make objectively indeterminate which woman that will be, i.e. to make 
it the case that there actually is no particular woman x of whom it is true that John will 
marry x. So, it would remain that the indefinite is non-specific in (23). 
 Assuming that the indefinite is non-specific in (23), exactly as in (24), what must 
be explained is why the answer No one in particular is good in the latter dialogue but odd 
in the former. Here I’ll put forward a suggestion, to be formally developed in the 
following section. Assuming that the answer No one in particular abbreviates John won’t 
marry any particular Italian in (23) and John doesn’t want to marry any particular 
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Italian in (24), respectively, the contrast between the two dialogues corresponds to the 
contrast between the contradictory (25a) and the consistent (25b): 
(25) a. ??John will marry an Italian, but he won’t marry any particular Italian. 
 b. John wants to marry an Italian, but he doesn’t want to marry any particular 
Italian. 
The formulation in (25a) makes it clear that the problem with the answer No one in 
particular in (23) is actually determined by a logical contradiction: that answer directly 
denies what has been previously asserted by uttering John will marry an Italian. 
Intuitively, if it is true that John will marry an Italian, then it is true that he will marry 
some particular Italian. On the other hand, it can be true that John wants to marry an 
Italian, without being true that he wants to marry some particular Italian. 
 However – and here we come to the core of my suggestion, we cannot conclude 
from these observations that an Italian is specific in (25a), since we have not yet 
excluded the possibility that an indefinite in a will-sentence would be in the scope of a 
modal quantifier that, unlike the modal quantifier underlying want, would for some 
reason be bound to take maximum scope. According to this possibility, there would be a 
modal quantifier ∀ underlying each one of the two will-sentences in (25a), and this 
hypothetical quantifier would take scope over the positive indefinite an Italian and, 
crucially, over the negative indefinite (not) any particular Italian as well, that is, (25a) 
would be formally represented as the conjunction of two statements of the form ∀α∃βX 
and ∀α¬∃βX, which, assuming that the domain of ∀α is not empty, logically contradict 
each other. On the other hand, the modal quantifier lexically provided by want in (25b) 
would be able to take narrow scope with respect to other scope-bearing elements, so that 
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the non-contradictory conjunction of two statements of the form ∀α∃βX and ¬∃β∀αX 
would be a possible formal representation of (25b). 
 The core of my proposal is precisely that the possibility just highlighted is in fact 
realized. In the next section I will cast my proposal in a formal framework and show how 
the proposed analysis applies to the main data considered above. 
5.  Formalization of the proposal 
To anticipate the main lines, I am going to propose that will-sentences, though not being 
modal in the same sense as sentences with must, still involve a universal quantification 
over a domain of modal alternatives: the domain of possible futures that are open at the 
time of utterance (Prior 1967, Thomason 1984). This universal quantification is due to a 
supervaluational strategy aimed at achieving the truth-conditional assessment of the will-
sentence in spite of the plurality of possible futures that are all legitimate candidates for 
the world of evaluation. I already stress that the universal quantification is not part of the 
basic semantics of will, which on my analysis is treated as an extensional tense marker, 
and it cannot enter into scope interactions with other scope-bearing elements occurring in 
the sentence, unlike the quantification lexically triggered by must and similar modal 
verbs. 
5.1  The semantic framework 
5.1.1  The model and the semantic metalanguage 
I cast the analysis in a semantic framework called Partial Branching Time (PBT) in Del 
Prete (2013). A PBT-model is built on a domain of Kratzerian situations (Kratzer 1989): 
maximal moments of classical Branching Time,21 that is, instantaneous events maximally 
extended through space, are replaced by partial situations as basic elements which are 
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partially ordered by the relation of temporal precedence. The central idea of Branching 
Time is extended to PBT: every situation comes with a unique past but many possible 
futures. Formally, this means that the relation of temporal precedence ≤S will not be a 
linear order on the domain of situations, but a partial order generating tree structures. 
Given any two situations s1, s2, the interpretation of the relational statement s1 ≤S s2 is that 
s1 did occur from the perspective of s2, while s2 might occur from the perspective of s1 
(Belnap 1992), the occurrence of s2 being expected given some relevant facts in s1 and in 
its past. World-histories are defined as maximal chains of situations. Given any two 
(world-)histories h, h', and given any situation s, the relational statement h ≈s h' means 
that h and h' are identical up to and including situation s and diverge from s onwards – in 
other terms, h' is a historical alternative to h at s.22 
I assume a type system containing the basic semantic types e (for individuals), t 
(for truth values), i (for situations), and s (for world-histories).23 The letters h, h1, h2…, s, 
s1, s2…, and  x, y, x1, y1… are used as variables over histories, situations, and individuals, 
respectively. c is a context of utterance, i.e. a sequence of parameter values among which 
we find the time of utterance ct, i.e. a given situation containing the utterance event, and 
the circumstance of utterance cw – in the cases of interest to us, as we’ll see, cw does not 
correspond to a single history in the PBT-model, but to a set of such histories. Two value-
assignments are used: f is a one-place function which assigns individuals to variables of 
type e, while g is a two-place function which assigns situations to variables of type i 
relative to a world-history: given variable si of type i and world-history h, g(si, h) is a 
situation belonging to h. 
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As in Heim & Kratzer (1998), the lambda-term λx: ϕ. ψ represents a partial 
function f which is defined for an object x if and only if the domain condition ϕ is 
satisfied; if f is defined for x, then the value it assigns to x is whatever value is described 
by ψ. I introduce a notation that will enable us to represent the result of applying a partial 
function f to an object x, while keeping track of the definedness condition of f in the 
description of the output: if λx: ϕ[x]. ψ[x] represents the partial function f, then the result 
of applying f to an object denoted by a constant a is described by the notation {ϕ[a]} 
ψ[a], whose intuitive meaning is that we get the value ψ[a] provided that the domain 
condition ϕ[a] is satisfied. 
 The evaluation function [[ ]]  is parameterized to a context c, assignment functions 
f and g, and a world (circumstance of evaluation) w. When the circumstance w is set up 
by the context, i.e. w is the circumstance of the context (or actual circumstance), we have 
the case of denotation in context, which, for sentential utterances, coincides with truth in 
context. Since we are only interested in truth in context here, the circumstance parameter 
w in [[ ]]c,f,g,w will always take the actual circumstance cw as its value.24 I assume that 
contexts normally set up a determinate value for their parameters, e.g. the agent 
parameter is valuated as the particular author of the utterance, the time parameter as the 
particular time at which the utterance occurs, and so on.  
5.1.2  Openness of the world parameter 
As far as the world parameter is concerned, however, I assume that we face a lack of 
determinateness: due to the open character of the future state of the world, the context 
cannot set up a particular history as value for this parameter. Thus, the world parameter is 
an instance of open contextual parameter (Belnap et al. 2001, Bonomi & Del Prete 
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2008), i.e. a contextual parameter that allows for any one of a plurality of equally 
legitimate valuations. In the following, I will technically implement the openness of the 
world parameter cw by having its value represented as the set of all the candidates for the 
future continuation of the present situation ct, i.e. the set of all histories h in the PBT-
model such that ct ∈ h – these histories are identical up to and including the present 
situation ct and diverge only from some point after ct. As far as the semantic evaluation of 
past tensed sentences is concerned, the openness of the world parameter does not pose 
any problem to us, given the backward-linear structure of the PBT-model. As we turn to 
the evaluation of a future tense sentence WILL(p), however, the openness of the world 
parameter does raise a problem: in this case, we face a plurality of possible histories that 
are all legitimate candidates to represent the actual future state of the world, and we don’t 
know a priori which one should be selected for the semantic evaluation of the prejacent 
proposition p. I will assume that the way out of this indeterminateness problem is a 
supervaluational strategy of universal quantification over the domain of possible histories 
(Thomason 1984), whereby the temporal variable that on my analysis is introduced by 
will gets instantiated on every possible future. The default interpretation of a will-
sentence will thus be a universal quantification over a domain of possible futures. 
 In the following subsections, I will provide the technical details of the semantic 
analysis of the main linguistic ingredients in our examples: verbal and nominal 
predicates, modal predicates, indefinite NPs and anaphoric definite pronouns, and, 
finally, the future auxiliary will – the main target of our inquiry. 
5.2  Verbal and nominal predicates 
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I assume that verbal and nominal predicates alike introduce a situation argument into the 
semantic representation, besides the individual arguments that are predictable from their 
surface argument structures. Situation and individual arguments alike get locally bound 
by λ-operators in the usual way. This is shown in (26) for the transitive verb marry and in 
(27) for the noun woman: 
(26) [[ marry ]]  =  λs. λy. λx. marry(s, x, y) 
(27) [[ woman ]]  =  λs. λx. woman(s, x) 
Thus, the verb marry denotes a function which takes a situation s, an individual y and 
another individual x as arguments, and yields the true as value if and only if x marries y in 
s, whereas the noun woman denotes a function which takes a situation s and an individual 
x as arguments and yields the true as value if and only if x is a woman in s. 
5.3  Modal predicates 
As in Kratzerian approaches to modality, I analyze both the epistemic and the teleological 
interpretation of must and should in terms of universal quantification over a domain of 
modal alternatives, where the difference between the two interpretations comes down to a 
difference in how the domain of quantification is defined. I will not make explicit 
reference to ordering sources, though, and I will instead use the simplified notation 
ALTepistemic(w, w')  (respectively, ALTteleo(w, w'))  to mean that w' is an epistemic 
(respectively, teleological) alternative to w which is most compatible with certain 
relevant norms holding in w. The intensional verb want, which unlike modal auxiliaries 
expresses a propositional attitude of its subject, is also analyzed in terms of universal 
quantification over modal alternatives, i.e. the possible worlds in which the subject’s 
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desires are realized (or bouletic alternatives of the subject with respect to the actual 
world). 
To account for the intuitive relation of modal dependence between must / should 
and want in Karttunen-type discourses like (13) (repeated below as [28]), I assume that 
must / should can quantify over a domain of possible worlds that they inherit from a 
preceding modal sentence. 
(28) Mary wants to marry a rich man. He must be a banker. 
In the case of (28), want is interpreted relative to a modal base which is the set of Mary’s 
bouletic alternatives to the actual world (in symbol, {w: ALTboule(cw, w, Mary)}), and the 
first sentence says that in every one of these worlds Mary marries somebody who is a rich 
man in that world. Then the subsequent modal must is interpreted relative to a modal base 
which in fact coincides with the preceding one: the second sentence says that every world 
w which is one of Mary’s bouletic alternatives to the actual world cw in which she marries 
a rich man (hence, every w which is one of Mary’s bouletic alternatives to cw tout court) 
is such that the rich man Mary marries in w is a banker in w. 
I do not assume that the future auxiliary will is to be treated on a par with modal 
predicates like want; accordingly, I will treat it in a separate subsection (sect. 5.5). 
5.4  Indefinite NPs and discourse-level definite pronouns 
Indefinite NPs are assumed to semantically contribute existential quantification, as 
in standard Russellian treatments. More specifically, indefinites are Generalized 
Quantifiers over individuals (usual semantic type <<e,t>,t>). As such, they undergo 
Quantifier Raising (QR) at LF, leaving a coindexed trace behind which gets bound by a 
local λ-operator. By QR, an indefinite may end up being adjoined to a VP. On my 
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analysis, VPs have semantic type <i,t>, the type of properties of situations. This means 
that when QR targets an indefinite α in a structure [VP…α…], the resulting adjunction 
site λi [VP…ti…] will end up having semantic type <i,<e,t>>, not <e,t>. For cases of this 
sort, I assume that the indefinite is shifted from its basic type <<e,t>,t> to the type 
<<i,<e,t>>,<i,t>>.25 Unlike in standard Russellian treatments (e.g. Ludlow & Neale 
1991), and following insights from “choice-function” theorists (e.g. Reinhart 1997, 
Kratzer 1998), I assume that the representation of an indefinite NP at LF involves a 
variable over choice-functions (c-functions, for short) which is carried by the indefinite 
determiner a, and can either be assigned a contextually salient function or be bound by an 
existential quantifier with free scope options relative to other scope-bearing elements in 
the sentence. I follow Kratzer (1998) more closely in assuming that c-functions have 
variable adicity; in the cases of interest to us, a c-function f will take two arguments, i.e. a 
property P and a situation or possible world s, and will yield an individual f(P, s) = x 
which has property P in s. To give an example, the NP a blond woman is interpreted as 
follows (the subscript ‘f’ on the indefinite determiner is the c-function variable provided 
by it): 
(29) [[ [af blond woman] ]]  =  λP<i,<e,t>>. λsj. ∃x [f(blond-woman, si) = x ∧ P(sj, x)]26 
I further assume an e-type analysis of definite pronouns in discourse-level 
anaphoric relations, along the lines of Heim (1990) and Elbourne (2002). To show how 
all these assumptions work together in a particular case, consider discourse (30): 
(30) John married a blond woman. She was twenty years old. 
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For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that the LF of (30) is as in (31), where the past 
tense morpheme -ed carries a referential index whose value must be a situation in the 
past, as in referential/presuppositional analyses of tense (Heim 1994). 
(31) [TP -ed0 [VP [af blond woman]1 λ1[VP John marry t1]]] [TP -ed2 [VP she1 be 20]] 
The semantic values of the LF-constituents [af blond woman]1, λ1[VP John marry t1], 
and she1 are given in (32a-c) below, while the truth conditions of the whole discourse are 
given in (32d). Since the meaning of the second sentence in (30), intuitively, is that the 
relevant woman was 20 years old at the same time that John married her, I assume that 
the past tense morpheme -ed2 in the second sentence refers to the same situation as the 
past tense morpheme -ed0 in the first sentence. Furthermore, I assume that the c-function 
variable f carried by the indefinite determiner is assigned a contextually salient function 
fc in this case. 
(32) a. [[ [af blond woman]1 ]]c  =  λP<i,<e,t>>. λsj. ∃x [fc(blond-woman,si) = x ∧ P(sj, x)] 
 b. [[  λ1[VP John marry t1] ]]  =  λsj. λx. marry(sj, John, x) 
 c. [[  she1 ]] c  =  [ιx][fc(blond-woman, si) = x] 
 d. [[  (30) ]] c  = 1  iff  ∃x {s0 <S ct}[fc(blond-woman, s0) = x ∧ marry(s0, John, x)] 
∧ 20-years-old(s0, [ιx][fc(blond-woman, s0) = x]) 
The analysis correctly predicts that (30) is true if and only if there is a blond woman x, 
selected in the contextually relevant past situation s by the contextually relevant 
procedure fc, such that John marries x in s and x is twenty years old in s. 
5.5  The future auxiliary will 
I propose that will has the semantics of a tense marker: it introduces a temporal variable 
into the semantic representation, whose value is presupposed to be a situation in the 
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future of the utterance situation. No quantification whatsoever over modal alternatives is 
semantically contributed by will. Hence, will is different from modal predicates like want, 
that, as we have seen in sect. 5.3, do semantically contribute quantification over a domain 
of modal alternatives. 
The lexical entry for will is given in (33) (the subscript ‘k’ on the tense marker is 
the temporal index that it bears at LF, which matches the situation variable ‘sk’ in the 
semantic representation): 
(33) [[ willk ]] c, g, h  =  λP<i, t> : ct ≤S g(sk, h). P(g(sk, h)) 
On this analysis, will takes a property of situations as argument and yields a truth value, 
provided that a certain condition is satisfied. The domain condition ct ≤S g(sk, h) in (33) is 
the presupposition triggered by will, according to which the value of the temporal 
variable ‘sk’ has to be in the future of the utterance situation ct along the history of 
evaluation h. 
To see how this analysis works on a concrete case, consider sentence (34), given 
along with its LF (35). 
(34)  John will marry a blond woman. 
(35) [TP willk [VP3 [NP af blond woman]1 λ1[VP2 John [VP1 marry t1]]]] 
I will first make the simplifying assumption that the world parameter of the evaluation 
function [[ ]]  is set to a determinate world-history h. Given this assumption, the truth 
conditions of (34), relative to LF (35), are compositionally derived as follows (I also 
assume that the context of utterance provides a value for the c-function variable of the 
indefinite): 
(36) [[ John ]]  =  John 
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 [[ marry ]]  =  λsi. λye. λxe. marry(s, x, y) 
 [[ [VP1 marry t1] ]] c, f, h  =  λs. λx. marry(s, x, f(t1)) 
 [[  [VP2 John [VP1 marry t1]] ]] c, f, h  =  λs. marry(s, John, f(t1)) 
 [[  λ1[VP2 John [VP1 marry t1]] ]] c, f, h  =  λs. λx. [[ [VP2 John [VP1 marry t1]] ]] c, f[1/x], h 27 
 [[ a blond woman ]] c, f, h  =  λP<i,<e,t>>. λs. ∃x [fc(blond-woman, s) = x ∧ P(s, x)] 
 [[  [VP3 [NP a blond woman]1 λ1[VP2 John [VP1 marry t1]]] ]] c, f, h  =  λs. ∃x [fc(blond-
woman, s) = x ∧ marry(s, John, x)] 
 [[ [TP willk [VP3 [NP a blond woman]1 λ1[VP2 John [VP1 marry t1]]]] ]] c, g, h = 1 
 iff   {ct ≤S g(sk, h)} ∃x [fc(blond-woman, g(sk, h)) = x ∧ marry(g(sk, h), John, x)] 
Thus, on the assumption that the world parameter of the evaluation function is set to the 
particular history h, the analysis predicts that (34) is true if and only if there is a blond 
woman x, selected in the situation g(sk, h) ∈ h by the contextually relevant procedure fc, 
such that John marries x in g(sk, h) – provided that g(sk, h) follows the utterance situation 
ct along h.28 
 This, however, is not the whole story about will – only the whole semantic story. 
Indeed, I have assumed in sect. 5.1 that when a sentence WILL(p) is uttered, normally the 
context of utterance does not set up a determinate history as the world of evaluation, due 
to the openness of the future. Accordingly, the other part of the story about will is that it 
comes to have a modal potential which depends on the forward branching structure of the 
PBT-model. The whole range of histories passing through ct is relevant for the truth 
conditional evaluation, and in order to overcome the plurality of histories speakers resort 
to a supervaluational strategy requiring that the future tensed statement hold for any such 
history. To see how the analysis works in a concrete case, consider (34) again. The 
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“supervaluated” truth conditions are now given in (37) (as before, I assume that the 
context provides a value for the c-function variable): 
(37) [[ [TP willk [VP3 [NP af blond woman]1 λ1[VP2 John [VP1 marry t1]]]] ]] c, g, cw  = 1 
 iff ∀h1 [h1 ≈ct h0 → {ct ≤S g(sk, h1)} ∃x [fc(blond-woman, g(sk, h1)) = x ∧ 
marry(g(sk, h1), John, x)]] 
The analysis predicts that (34) is true, relative to the (open) actual circumstance cw, if and 
only if for every history h1 in cw, there is a blond woman x, selected by the contextually 
relevant procedure fc in the situation g(sk, h1), such that John marries x in g(sk, h1) – 
provided that g(sk, h1) follows the utterance situation ct along h1. Notice that, from these 
modalized truth conditions for (34), it follows that there may be different women married 
by John on different futures. This is precisely the upshot of the openness of the future: it 
may be indeterminate which woman John will marry. 
Before moving to the next section, it is worth emphasizing that, on the analysis 
that I have proposed, universal quantification is not contributed by the semantics of will, 
but enters the picture through the (super)valuation of the global linguistic context in 
which will is embedded. The only contribution of will to the semantic representation is a 
temporal variable. Notice that a consequence of the supervaluational approach is the 
following: if the event reported by the future sentence occurs at some values of the 
temporal variable but not at others, the statement cannot be evaluated as true, since the 
event may fail to occur at the relevant time, nor can it be evaluated as false, since the 
event may occur then.29 This, I believe, correctly accounts for the intuition that genuine 
“future contingents”, such as the statement The die will come up six next time – made in a 
context in which the die is known to be fair, cannot possibly be evaluated as either true or 
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false at the time they are uttered, while one has to wait for positive or negative future 
evidence in order to assess the utterance (see MacFarlane 2003, 2007). 
5.6  Stalnaker’s Asymmetry explained 
Given that the universal quantification is not lexically contributed by will but comes from 
the supervaluational strategy aimed at evaluating the whole sentential utterance, one 
might wonder how the universal quantifier may scopally interact with the existential 
quantifier of the indefinite to generate the specific/non-specific ambiguity. In fact, I claim 
that there is no possible scope interaction between the two. This lack of scope interaction 
is far from being an obstacle to explaining specific construals. So much so that I will 
propose that there are no scope interactions between the indefinite and the modal in 
lexically modal sentences either (e.g. Mary wants to marry a rich man). 
The explanation of the specific/non-specific ambiguity in terms of scope 
ambiguity, which I have temporarily assumed in sect. 2, is not the only available option, 
and not even the most plausible one from the point of view of a principled theory of the 
syntax-semantics interface, as many scholars have emphasized (Reinhart 1997, Kratzer 
1998, Schwarzschild 2002, to cite only a few). Here, I will show how the analysis of 
indefinites that I have delineated in sect. 5.4, together with the other semantic 
assumptions from the previous sections, can account for specific indefinites in modal and 
will-sentences, without the need to assign the existential quantifier of the indefinite wide 
scope relative to the modal quantifier. 
Consider sentences (38) and (39) below. Assuming that the situation argument of 
the choice function is instantiated to the actual world cw in both cases, my analysis 
predicts the truth conditions given in (38') and (39'): 
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(38) John will marry an Italian woman. 
(38') ∀h1 [h1 ≈ct h0 → {ct ≤S g(sk, h1)} ∃x [fc(Italian-woman, cw) = x ∧ marry(g(sk, h1), 
John, x)]] 
 (There is an Italian woman x, uniquely identified in the actual world by the 
contextually relevant procedure fc, such that, for every possible future h, John 
marries x on h.) 
(39) John wants to marry an Italian woman. 
(39') ∀w1 [ALTboule(cw, w1, John) → ∃x [fc(Italian-woman, cw) = x ∧ marry(w1, John, x)]] 
 (There is an Italian woman x, uniquely identified in the actual world by the 
contextually relevant procedure fc, such that, for every bouletic alternative of John’s 
w, John marries x in w.) 
Both truth conditions make it clear that the Italian woman selected by the c-function of 
the indefinite is independent from the modal alternative universally quantified over (be it 
a possible future, as in [38'], or a bouletic alternative of John’s, as in [39']), since the 
woman is uniquely identified relative to the actual circumstance by the c-function.30 
 I can now proceed to account for the data at the basis of Stalnaker’s Asymmetry, 
namely the contrast between (40) and (41) below. As I said in sect. 5.4, my analysis 
allows for the possibility that the c-function variable carried by the indefinite determiner 
be bound by an existential quantifier with free scope options relative to other scope-
bearing elements. This possibility comes about whenever the context does not provide a 
value for the c-function variable. I suggest that the phrase no one in particular, as 
occurring in (40) and (41), signals that the context of utterance does not set up a c-
function which uniquely identifies an individual from the actual circumstance. Therefore, 
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(40) and (41) are cases in which existential closure of the c-function variable is called for. 
Crucial for the explanation of the contrast between the two sentences is my assumption 
that the universal quantification underlying the will-sentence, unlike the one lexically 
triggered by want, is bound to have maximum scope: in particular, it cannot take narrow 
scope relative to negation in (41), nor can it take narrow scope relative to the existential 
closure of the c-function variable. 
Given all this, the truth conditions that are derived on my analysis for (40) and 
(41) are (40') and (41'), respectively.31 
(40) John wants to marry an Italian, but no one in particular. 
(40') ∃f ∀w1 [ALTboule(cw, w1, John) → ∃x [f(Italian, w1) = x ∧ marry(w1, John, x)]] ∧ 
¬∃f ∀w1 [ALTboule(cw, w1, John) → ∃x [f(Italian, cw) = x ∧ marry(w1, John, x)]] 
(41) ??John will marry an Italian, but no one in particular. 
(41') ∀h1 [h1 ≈ct h0 → ∃f ∃x [f(Italian, h1) = x ∧ marry(g(sk, h1), John, x)]] ∧ ∀h1 [h1 ≈ct h0 
→ ¬∃f  ∃x [f(Italian, cw) = x ∧ marry(g(sk, h1), John, x)]] 
On the one hand, sentence (40) is predicted to be true if and only if there is some way f to 
select Italian women relative to bouletic alternatives of John’s such that, for every such 
alternative w, John marries the woman selected by f in w, but there is no way to select a 
particular Italian woman x in the actual world cw such that, for every one of John’s 
bouletic alternatives w, John marries precisely x in w. These truth conditions are coherent 
and correspond to the intuitive meaning of (40). 
On the other hand, the truth conditions in (41') say that for every possible future h, there 
is some way f to select an Italian woman x in h such that John marries x in h, and for 
every possible future h, there is no way f to select a particular Italian woman x in the 
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actual world cw such that John marries precisely x in h. These truth conditions are 
incoherent: recall that the actual world cw is made up exactly of those world-histories h 
which are open possibilities at the time of utterance ct, namely the histories which are 
universally quantified in (41'), therefore (41') expresses the unsatisfiable requirement that 
on every possible future be both possible to find an Italian woman married by John and 
impossible to find such a woman. 
We have finally attained an explanation of why (41) sounds incoherent, unlike 
(40). Given that the contrast between (40) and (41) has been shown to be at the basis of 
Stalnaker’s Asymmetry, we have by the same token explained the asymmetry in question. 
5.7  Analysis of Karttunen-type discourses 
When the discourses (42a,b) below obtain the “non-specific indefinite + teleological 
modal” reading described in sect. 3 above, they provide instances of modal subordination 
(as argued for in sect. 3). In this case, the definite pronoun he is interpreted in the scope 
of should and fails to refer to an individual salient in the discourse-context. 
(42) a. Mary will marry a rich mani. Hei should be a banker. 
 b. Mary wants to marry a rich mani. Hei should be a banker. 
I propose that in discourse (42a), under the modal subordination reading, the 
interpretation of should is dependent on the modal quantification over possible futures 
underlying the interpretation of the will-sentence, in a similar way as the interpretation of 
the same modal is dependent on the modal quantification lexically triggered by want in 
(42b). The dependence of the interpretation of a modal on a preceding modal context is to 
be understood as I have proposed in sect. 5.3: the modal should in (42a) quantifies over a 
modal base which coincides with the domain of the preceding universal quantifier over 
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historical alternatives, that is to say, the domain of should is exactly the set of histories 
which are open possibilities at the time of utterance ct (in symbols, {h: ct ∈ h}), and the 
should-sentence introduces an additional condition on each alternative h in this domain 
(on top of the condition introduced by the will-sentence, to the effect that Mary marries a 
rich man in h); intuitively, the should-sentence requires that any such historical 
alternative match some relevant norms originating from Mary. 
Let’s turn for a moment to (42b). In this case, intuitively, the rich man married by 
Mary in her bouletic worlds has to be a banker according to Mary’s relevant standards of 
eligibility – the standards that any man has to meet in order to be eligible to become 
Mary’s husband. Thus, the meaning of the whole discourse (42b) could be paraphrased as 
‘Each w which is one of Mary’s bouletic alternatives is such that Mary marries a rich man 
in w, and each one of such alternatives w that is also most compatible with Mary’s 
standards of eligibility is such that the rich man married by Mary in w is a banker in w’. 
Now, in the case of (42a), the relevant norms to which the interpretation of should 
refers are not fixed as easily as in the case of (42b), plausibly because the tense marker 
will, unlike the full modal verb want, is devoid of lexical meaning, therefore it is less 
clear to what propositional attitude of Mary the relevant norms presupposed by should 
are related. It seems plausible to assume that, in (42a), the relevant norms are more 
sensitive to the context than in (42b): they could be related to Mary’s bouletic attitude, 
but they need not. 
Before proposing a formal analysis of the modal subordination reading of (42a), 
let us consider its modally independent reading, i.e. the one in which the indefinite is 
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specific and should epistemic. The truth-conditions corresponding to this reading of (42a) 
are computed on the basis of the LF (43) and are expressed in (44): 
(43) [TP willk [VP3 [NP a rich man]1 λ1[VP2 Mary [VP1 marry t1]]]]  [ModP should [VP he1 be a 
banker]] 
(44) [[ (40) ]] c, g, cw = 1   iff 
 iff   ∀h1 [h1 ≈ct h0 → {ct ≤S g(sk, h1)} ∃x [fc(rich-man, cw) = x ∧ marry(g(sk, h1), 
Mary, x)]] ∧ ∀w1 [ALTepistemic(cw, w1) → banker(w1, [ιx][fc(rich-man, cw) = x])] 
The analysis predicts that discourse (42a) is true under the modally independent reading 
if and only if for every possible future h, there is a rich man x which is uniquely 
identified in the actual world such that Mary marries x in g(sk, h), and every possible 
world w which is epistemically accessible from the actual world is such that the particular 
rich man x is a banker in w. Notice that the definite description [ιx][fc(rich-man, cw) = x] 
does not contain any occurrence of the variable ‘w1’ bound by the universal quantifier 
‘∀w1’ and picks up the same value as the choice function fc, i.e. the same rich man across 
different epistemic alternatives, and that rich man is said to be a banker on every 
epistemic alternative. This seems to be intuitively correct. 
Turning to the modal subordination reading of (42a), the corresponding truth-
conditions are given in (45): 
(45) [[ (42a) ]] c, g, cw = 1   iff 
 iff   ∀h1 [h1 ≈ct h0 → {ct ≤S g(sk, h1)} ∃x [f(rich-man, h1) = x ∧ marry(g(sk, h1), 
Mary, x)]] ∧ ∀h1 [(h1 ≈ct h0 ∧ ALTteleo(cw, h1)) → banker(g(sk, h1), [ιx][f(rich-man, 
h1) = x])] 
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The analysis predicts that discourse (42a) is true under the relevant reading if and only if 
for every possible future h, there is some rich man x which is selected in h by the 
procedure f, such that Mary marries x in g(sk, h), and if h is also most compatible with 
some relevant norms holding in the actual circumstance, the rich man x is a banker in 
g(sk, h). Notice that, in contrast with the truth conditions for the modally independent 
reading of (42a), the definite description [ιx][f(rich-man, h1) = x] does contain an 
occurrence of a variable that is bound by the universal quantifier ‘∀h1’, thus it picks up 
different rich men across different teleological alternatives, and the selected man is said 
to be a banker on the corresponding teleological alternative. This too seems to correspond 
to the relevant interpretation of the discourse. 
6.  The status of the supervaluational mechanism and the interaction between 
pragmatics and semantics 
On the view that I have advocated, the supervaluational mechanism accounting for the 
presence of a universal quantification over possible histories in the truth conditions of a 
will-sentence is conceived of as pragmatic in nature. One might feel tempted to consider 
this mechanism as an instance of a top-down pragmatic process, comparable to those 
cases that have sometimes been described in the literature as free enrichment (Recanati 
2001, 2004). The outcome of the supervaluation of a will-sentence, however, would not 
be correctly described as the result of a process of free enrichment, as I show below. 
Consider sentence (46) below (the same as [34]): the proposition which is 
semantically expressed by this sentence in a context c, relative to an assignment g, is the 
function from world-histories to truth values given in (47) (standard semantic type <s,t>). 
No matter whether the context specifies a determinate history as value of the 
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circumstance parameter (as in [48]) or not (as in [49]), the truth conditions of (46) are 
obtained through the same proposition (47), with the difference between the truth 
conditions in (48) and those in (49) being uniquely due to the fact that, in the former case, 
the proposition is required to hold of the particular history specified as value of the 
circumstance parameter, whereas, in the latter case, it is required to hold of all the 
histories that are open possibilities in the context. 
(46)  John will marry a blond woman. 
(47) [[ (46) ]] c, g  =  λh. {ct ≤S g(sk, h)} ∃x [fc(blond-woman, g(sk, h)) = x ∧ marry(g(sk, 
h), John, x)] 
(48) [[ (46) ]] c, g, h = 1 
 iff   {ct ≤S g(sk, h)} ∃x [fc(blond-woman, g(sk, h)) = x ∧ marry(g(sk, h), John, x)] 
(49) [[ (46) ]] c, g, cw  = 1 
 iff  ∀h1 [h1 ≈ct h0 → {ct ≤S g(sk, h1)} ∃x [fc(blond-woman, g(sk, h1)) = x ∧ 
marry(g(sk, h1), John, x)]] 
This shows that the supervaluational strategy actually does not enrich the proposition 
semantically expressed by the sentence, which is the same before and after the 
supervaluation has taken place. Accordingly, on my analysis, the modal flavor 
characterizing a will-sentence could not be described as the result of a process of free 
enrichment.  
The point remains that the supervaluational mechanism belongs to the pragmatic 
domain. One might then wonder why this mechanism is not optional, unlike other more 
familiar cases of pragmatic processes (e.g. those underlying the generation of 
implicatures).32 I suggest that the extent to which this mechanism is not optional matches 
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the extent to which our talks about the future confront us with a plurality of possible 
outcomes. Since we have assumed that the default situation in human conversations has 
the context leaving it undetermined what future will become actual, our expectation is 
that a universal quantification over histories will be triggered whenever a linguistic 
expression (be it will, be going to, the simple present or the progressive) is used in such  
conversations to refer to some future eventuality.33 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper I have considered two main empirical issues concerning the semantics of 
will-sentences, namely Stalnaker’s Asymmetry and modal subordination readings in 
Karttunen-type discourses with will. The former prima facie points to drawing a clearcut 
distinction between will and modal verbs like want, to the effect that will would not 
license non-specific indefinite objects. The latter points in the opposite direction: will 
seems to pattern like want in certain contexts, allowing for a non-specific interpretation 
of an indefinite object. This unexpected fact suggests that a modal feature is perhaps 
present in the interpretation of a will-sentence. I have made a theoretical proposal that 
tries to profit as much as possible from both Stalnaker’s and Karttunen’s lessons: will acts 
semantically as a tense, not as a modal, hence it doesn’t contribute a quantifier over 
modal alternatives by itself; a modal feature, however, is introduced in the interpretation 
of will-sentences through a supervaluational strategy that universally quantifies over 
historical alternatives representing the possible futures. The fact that the universal 
quantification over modal alternatives is not part of the semantics of will has been shown 
to have some natural consequences (in primis, the lack of scope interactions) that 
ultimately contribute to explain some basic facts at the origin of Stalnaker’s Asymmetry. 
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On the other hand, the fact that a modal universal quantification is anyway there when a 
will-sentence is interpreted has been shown to have consequences with respect to the 
possibility of modal subordination readings in Karttunen-type discourses with will. 
A property of the semantic approach that I have proposed is that, since the modal 
feature characterizing the interpretation of a will-sentence does not come as part of the 
semantics of will but as a consequence of the branching structure of the future, the modal 
behaviour of will is not viewed as an idiosyncratic property of this tense marker. In fact, a 
prediction that we can make on this approach is that necessity modal interpretations of 
the future tense should be available cross-linguistically. This prediction, as far as I can 
tell, has broad empirical support, and is confirmed even by languages which have a full-
fledged synthetic (inflectional) future, like Italian. 
Finally, it would be interesting to consider the relative merits of the proposed 
analysis vis à vis one which treats will as a necessity modal in accounting for cases where 
will interacts with modal adverbs of varying quantificational forces, as are discussed by 
Kissine (2008). Some relevant examples of this phenomenon are (50) and (51): 
(50) Some of us here today will possibly have lost infants and young children from our 
own families.34 
(51) It will hardly have gone unnoticed that Step 9 has been crammed with do’s and 
don’ts, all worthy of close revision.35 
If will were lexically a modal, it would be natural to regard such examples as instances of 
modal concord (in the sense of Geurts & Huytink 2006), but then the necessity modal 
analysis would face a difficulty in accounting for the co-occurrence of a necessity modal 
with modal adverbs characterized by such diverse quantificational forces as the ones in 
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(50) and (51). My expectation is that the analysis proposed in this paper would do better 
than a necessity modal analysis in providing an account of cases like (50) and (51). An 
attractive possibility would be to analyze the adverbs possibly and hardly in these 
examples as modal operators that quantify over the same modal alternatives that would 
otherwise be universally quantified over by the supervaluational strategy if the will 
sentence were not adverbially modified. I leave the task of developing this line of 
analysis for a future occasion. 
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1 The distinction between specific and non-specific indefinites, as I make use of it in this 
paper, is not to be intended as implying that the English determiner a is lexically 
ambiguous. In particular, it should not be understood in terms of the semantic opposition 
“referential” vs. “quantificational” indefinites in the sense of Fodor & Sag (1982). The 
way I intend it is as a surfacy semantic distinction, one which is in fact compatible with a 
uniform analysis of indefinites as existential quantifiers, as will be proposed in sect. 5. 
2 The attention in (Q) is restricted to extensional verbs for an obvious reason. Indefinite 
objects of intensional verbs can naturally obtain non-specific interpretations, both in past 
and in future tense contexts, as shown in (i) and (ii): 
(i) Mary looked for a book on modality, but she didn’t find one. 
 (‘Mary looked for some book on modality or other, but she didn’t find any such 
book.’) 
(ii) Mary will look for a book on modality, but she won’t find one. 
 (‘Mary will look for some book on modality or other, but she won’t find any such 
book.’) 
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The non-specific interpretation of a book on modality in (i) and (ii) has the same source: 
it depends on the intensionality of the verb look for, thus it does not tell us anything about 
whether the future tense itself has some intensional feature that makes it possible for the 
indefinite to be interpreted non-specifically. 
3 Sentences (2a) and (3a) are from Stalnaker (1981). 
4 Karttunen (2007) speaks of ‘epistemic’ and ‘deontic’ interpretation of must when he 
refers to the interpretations of (i.a) given in (i.b) and (i.c), respectively: 
(i) a. The director is looking for an innocent blonde. She must be 17 years old. 
 b. The director is looking for an innocent blonde. It is likely that she is 17 years old. 
 c. The director is looking for an innocent blonde. It is necessary that she be 17 years 
old. 
Following a suggestion by an anonymous reviewer, I will adopt the different term 
‘teleological’ to refer to the interpretation of must in (i.c), exploiting the intuition that this 
reading can be paraphrased as ‘to be eligible to be picked up by the director, a blonde 
must be seventeen years old’. I will reserve the term ‘deontic’ for the interpretation of 
must in sentences like (ii) instead: 
(ii) John must return the book to the library by October 15th. 
5 Both dialogues are from Stalnaker (1981: 93-94). 
6 Stalnaker (1981: 93). In the same passage Stalnaker also remarks that the ambiguity 
between the two-readings of a woman in (8) “is of course not a matter of whether the 
speaker knows who the woman is. X might have meant the wide scope reading and still 
not have known who the woman is.”. I will return later on on the issue of subjective 
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ignorance of the referent’s identity (in sect. 4), while discussing supposed non-specific 
readings of indefinites in will-sentences. 
7 Stalnaker (1981: 94). 
8 For my present expository purposes, I temporarily assume the standard account of the 
specific/non-specific ambiguity, in terms of a scope interaction between the indefinite NP 
and the modal verb, as an intuitive and descriptively adequate explanation. The formal 
analysis that I will put forward in sect. 5, however, while maintaining that indefinites are 
interpreted as existential quantifiers in both specific and non-specific construals, keeps to 
a principle of interpretation in situ, even in cases of specific interpretation (Reinhart 
1997, Kratzer 1998, Schwarzschild 2002). 
9 Pretty much in the same way as the semantics of the Priorian tense operators P and F is 
given in first-order temporal logic. See Kissine (2008) for a proposal in which the future 
auxiliary will is analyzed as a Priorian tense operator. 
10 Karttunen makes the observation in question in footnote 3 of Karttunen (1976): 
“What remains unexplained here is the fact (pointed out to me by John Olney) that must 
in [(4a)] [Mary wants to marry a rich man. He must be a banker.] has two meanings 
depending on the specificity of the NP a rich man in the preceding sentence. If the first 
sentence is about a specific man, then must in the second sentence is interpreted in a 
rather weak sense: ‘It is likely that he is a banker’. But if the NP a rich man is 
nonspecific, the second sentence means: ‘It is necessary that he be a banker’.” 
11 The terminology adopted here is based on Portner (2009), who distinguishes deontic 
modality from teleological modality as two different sub-types of what he calls priority 
modals (Portner 2009: 135). On the one hand, deontic modals are based on moral 
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concepts such as obligation, right and wrong. On the other, teleological modals are based 
on the morally neutral concept of goal. In the reading of discourse (13) in which must 
expresses a requirement, clearly there is no moral concept involved, but only a goal. 
12 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 
13 It still seems to me that, in the sentence You should remind her that he must be a 
banker! from discourse (14), the definite pronoun he must have some sort of 
indeterminate or generic referent, in spite of its indefinite antecedent a rich man being 
interpretable specifically in this context. To be sure, the variant of (14) given in (i) would 
be odd: 
(i) I heard that Mary wants to marry Bill. You should remind her that Bill must be a 
banker! 
The sort of generic interpretation of the definite pronoun he that I suppose to characterize 
(14) could be a phenomenon similar to the interpretation of you in (ii): 
(ii) To get that job, you must have an expertise in formal semantics. 
Here, the pronoun you doesn’t seem to work as a device to refer to the particular 
addressee of the utterance, but rather as a variable that gets universally quantified, as in 
the semi-formal paraphrase ‘for all x, for x to get that job, x must have an expertise in 
formal semantics’. 
14 Remind you that we are assuming that Mary is the relevant source for the teleological 
modal base.  
15 The conclusion was: the future will does not license non-specific indefinites. 
16 Thanks to Bridget Copley for bringing my attention to this example (p.c.). Notice that 
discourse (17) doesn’t have an epistemic interpretation for the second sentence – the 
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sentence cannot mean ‘it is likely that the rich man she will marry is a banker’. What 
uniquely matters here, however, is the possibility of the teleological reading. 
17 The interesting fact about should is that, like must, and unlike will have to, it allows for 
both epistemic and root (e.g., deontic and teleological) readings. Thanks to Nicholas 
Asher for bringing my attention to the fact that should seems to be more prone to 
elaborate on a preceding will-sentence than must (p.c.). 
18 Portner (2009: 235) makes a similar observation, but he limits his claim to epistemic 
must, which he contrasts with epistemic may. His own example of the contrast is (i) vs. 
(ii) (his own [300a,b]), but we can add (iii) to his pattern to show the contrasting temporal 
behavior of should, analogous to may in this respect: 
(i) #John must be happy when he gets here tomorrow. 
(ii) John may be happy when he gets here tomorrow. 
(iii) John should be happy when he gets here tomorrow. 
19 As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out to me, discourses (22b) and (22c) involve 
will-sentences that are not interpreted as predictions, but as teleological statements 
themselves; for example, the will-sentence in (22b) could be paraphrased as ‘The 
Director of Policy and Research is required to hire and supervise a Policy and Research 
Associate’. This remark reinforces my point regarding the possibility of non-specific 
indefinite objects in will-sentences. 
20 The argument has been presented to me by Sandro Zucchi (p.c.). 
21 By classical Branching Time, I refer to the conception of BT which is proposed in 
Prior (1967) and Thomason (1984). The reader is referred to Belnap et al. (2001) for an 
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in-depth investigation of BT-models and a proposal of semantic analysis of natural 
language constructions based on such models. 
22 For a full-fledged presentation of a PBT-model, see Del Prete (2012). 
23 Notice that this system does not contain a type for times; this is because, in the adopted 
model, situations play the same role as is played by time intervals in other systems. 
24 The metalinguistic expression [[ E ]]c,f,g,w should be read as ‘the denotation of E relative 
to context c, assignments f and g, and world w’. In the following, I will freely skip 
reference to any evaluation parameters whenever they are not relevant for the semantic 
evaluation of a linguistic expression. 
25 A type-shift of this kind is an instance of what is known as Geach’s Rule in flexible 
categorial grammars.these truth 
26 The variables si, sj can, but need not, refer to the same situation. The empirical 
motivation for this is as follows. In a sentence like I saw a blonde, the most likely 
interpretation is that I saw a woman in a past situation s*, and the woman was blond in 
that same situation s*. On the other hand, the sentence A friend of mine was born in 
Novosibirsk is most likely interpreted as saying that somebody who is a friend of mine in 
the present situation was born in Novosibirsk in some past situation. Therefore, we have 
reasons to preserve the possibility that the situation out of which the c-function selects an 
individual and the situation projected by the verb predicate do not coincide. 
27 Where n is an individual variable and i an individual, f[n/i] is a value-assignment such 
that, for any individual variable m ≠ n, f[n/i](m) = f(m), and f[n/i](n) = i. 
28 The fictional assumption that I have made, to the effect that the world parameter of the 
evaluation function is set to a particular history, seems to describe a situation that actually 
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obtains in “narrative” contexts, in which the historical present is typically used, as in the 
following example taken from a Chronological History of Wyoming 
(http://www.shgresources.com/wy/timeline/): 
(i) 1941 - Richard Cheney is born in Lincoln, Nebraska, on January 30th. He will grow 
up in Casper, Wyoming, and earn his bachelor's and master's of arts degrees from the 
University of Wyoming. 
The purely temporal value of will appears clearly from examples of this type, where the 
narrated events are located in the past (in spite of being reported in the present tense) and 
the narrator has complete information about the relevant sequence of events. In examples 
of this sort there seems to be no plurality of possible futures involved in the evaluation of 
a will-sentence. 
29 The same situation arises in natural language in other cases in which the evaluator 
faces a plurality of objects relevant to the semantic evaluation – for example, when 
sentences containing vague predicates are used. Consider the pair in (i).  
(i)  a. Mount Everest is a high mountain. 
  b. Gran Sasso is a high mountain. 
No matter what standard of height for mountains we select, (i.a) is certain to wind up 
true; accordingly, we are inclined to evaluate it as true, regardless of how the context of 
utterance is. The truth of (i.b), however, is contingent on what standard of height for 
mountains counts as the most relevant standard in the context; accordingly, if we face a 
plurality of potentially relevant standards, we may be unable to evaluate the sentence as 
true or false, insofar as the standards may differ significantly from one another and, 
consequently, the sentence may turn out to be true relative to some and false relative to 
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others. The truth-status of (i.b) becomes clearer as soon as a definite standard of height is 
referred to, or a restricted class of standards is isolated – in this case the sentence will be 
evaluated as true if it is true relative to the strictest standard in the class, hence relative to 
any standard therein. These considerations on the evaluation of sentences with vague 
predicates make it clear that the situation we face when we evaluate future sentences is 
not new: we have a plurality of entities that are equally relevant for the evaluation, and it 
would be arbitrary to select any one of such entities as the right input for the evaluation 
function. In both cases, the evaluator’s strategy is supervaluational: evaluate as true (or 
false) just in case the choice of the entity relevant to the evaluation does not make any 
difference in the resulting value. 
An anonymous reviewer has suggested that the supervaluation works differently for a 
vague predicate like high and for a will-sentence: in the former case, the context may 
provide a standard as to what counts as high, but no such provision would be available in 
the case of the future. I disagree with the reviewer in view of the data about narrative 
contexts referred to in footnote 28. 
30 Note that the actual world cw in (38') encompasses all the historical alternatives in the 
domain of the universal quantifier ∀h1, according to my conception of the openness of 
the world parameter in PBT; thus, in (38') the actual world cw is related to those historical 
alternatives in a way in which it is not related to John’s bouletic alternatives in (39') – 
John’s bouletic alternatives are not part of cw as the historical alternatives at ct are. In 
spite of this relationship between cw and the world-histories quantified over in (38'), the 
point remains that the choice of the particular Italian woman fc(Italian, cw) is independent 
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from the particular world-history h selected to instantiate the universal quantifier ∀h1, 
that is to say, the selected woman does not co-vary with the world-history. 
31 To simplify the logical formula representing (41)’s truth conditions, I skip the part {ct 
≤S g(sk, h1)} corresponding to the presuppositional requirement of will that its temporal 
variable be instantiated in the future. 
32 Thanks to the editors for raising this question and for suggesting the line of answer 
sketched in the text. 
33 While limits of space prevent me from discussing the semantics of other markers of 
futurity in English (let alone in other languages), I refer the reader to Copley (2009) for 
an extensive study in which linguistic expressions of future reference are argued to 
involve universal quantification over histories. 
34 From: beehive.govt.nz, the official website of the New Zealand Government, 28 May 
2004 (http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/19875). 
35 From: Len Weinreich, Eleven steps to brand heaven, Kogan Page Publishers 2001. 
